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Splitting Fees or Splitting Hairs?
Fee Splitting and Health Care -

The Florida Experience
Richard 0. Jacobs and Elizabeth Goodman*
INTRODUcTION

In this paper we examine fee splitting under Florida law. This
evolving body of health care law is driven by administrative rule
making and interpretations of statutory law aimed at prohibiting
physicians and other health care professionals from paying for a
patient referral. Under the current regulatory environment,
there appears to be a lapse of common sense. However, experience with other applications of statutory law and rule making
suggests that reason and rationalism will eventually prevail over
the law of fee splitting.
For example, early court decisions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") denied medical plan participants damage claims against insurers withholding

benefits or care for any reason.' The courts viewed the preemption provisions of ERISA as the basis for denying even the most
egregious claims for malpractice or treatment denial damages.
With time and the persistence of insured plan participants, and
with the assistance of their attorneys, reason has begun to reenter the ERISA arena.
Until recently, the traditions and ethics of the learned professions universally exhibited a strong disdain for marketing and
advertising. With that disdain came prohibitions against fee
splitting, or paying for patient or client referrals.2 However, as
lines began to blur between businesses and professions, and as

professionals became pressured to promote their practices, marketing freedom increasingly prevailed and the strict promotional
rules of some professions have been relaxed. For example, accountants licensed in Florida are now permitted to offer insur* Richard 0. Jacobs and Elizabeth Goodman are lawyers practicing with Holland
& Knight, LLP at their St. Petersburg, Florida, office. They are members of the firm's
Health Law Group, representing physicians and their practices.
1. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (West 1998).
2. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE MONEY AND MoRALs 32 (1995).
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ance and investment products to their clients and are allowed to
charge commissions. In addition, lawyers are now permitted to
pay referral fees to other lawyers when the fees are disclosed to
clients.4
For health care practitioners, however, such freedoms do not
exist.- Perhaps the rationale arises from the idea that because
our government pays for health care, micro-management of
medicine to control costs is justified. Perhaps the rationale
comes from the ideology that marketing, over-utilization, and
fraud and abuse are inherently linked. Perhaps the rationale is
based on today's technological complexities and the difficulty in
determining what is "reasonable and necessary" health care that
is worth paying for.
Whatever the rationale, as managed care plans and provider
networks grow, as publicly held physician practice management
companies ("PPMC") consolidate practice management and
promotion, as federal and state governments increase their
micro-management of health care delivery, fee splitting has become a gigantic legal issue in the health care area.
In Florida, the fee-splitting issue was thrust to center stage by
the Florida Board of Medicine's 1997 advisory opinion in the
petition of Magan L. Bakarania, M.D. 6 The Medical Board advised Dr. Bakarania that a practice management agreement between a physician group and a PPMC, PhyMatrix, violated
Florida's fee-splitting statute.7 The management agreement
provided that PhyMatrix was paid a percentage management fee
in exchange for managing the practice and providing network
development and other practice-enhancement services. The
Board's opinion stated that the percentage management fee was
an illegal fee split.
In 1998, Dr. Bakarania's attorney requested an advisory opinion from the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") of the
Department of Health and Human Services on behalf of another physician. The OIG issued Advisory Opinion 98-48 indicating that a percentage fee PPMC management contract could
3. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 473.3205 (West 1998).
4. See FLA. STATE BAR RULE 4-1.5 (1998).
5. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (West 1998)
6.
In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Magan L. Bakarania, M.D., 20
F.A.L.R. 395 (1997).
7. FLA. STAT. ANN § 458.331(1)(i) (West 1998).
8. OIG Advisory Opinion No. 98-4 (last updated March 16, 1999) <http://
www.hhs.gov/progorg/oig>.
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violate the federal anti-kickback statute 9 because percentage
fees could encourage health care service over-utilization and
upcoding.
I.

FEE SPLITTING AND CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE

Early writings about medical practice economics indicate that
fee splitting was an ethical concern as early as the 1890s. Fee
splitting arose as an issue because surgeons had developed the
common practice of paying family practice physicians for patient
referrals. 10 In response, the American Medical Association developed an ethical prohibition against such practice." Additionally, between 1914 and 1953, twenty-two states passed laws
making fee splitting illegal.' 2 Today, at least3 thirty-six states
have laws prohibiting kickbacks or fee splits.'
The corporate practice of medicine doctrine generally prohib-4
its corporations from providing professional medical services.'
The rationale behind the doctrine is that only human beings can
be licensed to practice medicine and therefore corporations cannot provide medical care. Until the mid-1950s, the practice of
medicine by a corporate entity was viewed as harmful to medical science, individual patients and medical practitioners. The
development of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine effectively divided physicians into two camps. Most physicians
opposed the corporate control of medicine, believing it would
create a bidding war among physicians and would drastically decrease the level of reimbursement for physicians' services.
Other physicians welcomed the stability of income they believed
the corporate practice would provide. 5
The courts deciding against the corporate practice of medicine
reasoned that corporations were inherently incapable of practicing medicine because the corporation itself, as a legal entity, was
incapable of meeting the state training and licensing requirements applicable to the practice of medicine. 16 Courts ex9.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (West 1998).

10. See RoDWIN, supra note 2, at 22.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 32.
13. See id. at 43.
14. See Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practiceof Medicine Doctrine:An
Anachronism in the Modem Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 447 (1997).
15. See id. at 458.
16. See 6 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
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pressed concern that interposing the interests of a third party,
the corporation, into the physician-patient relationship would
cause the physician to be more interested in the needs of the
corporation than in the needs of his patients. Critics also contend that this interposition results in a fee split between the corporation and the physician. 17 Nonetheless, because of the
growth of corporate practice of medicine, several state legislatures passed legislation limiting the practice of medicine to natural persons.' 8
As a corporate practice of medicine doctrine developed, both
the doctrine and associated fee-splitting issues were addressed
by several health care professional associations, including the
American Medical Association, American Osteopathic Association, American Dental Association, American Podiatric Medical
Association, state health professional boards and the courts. 19
A.

American Medical Association

In 1957, the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association ("AMA") approved of the practice of medicine
through partnerships, associations or other lawful groups. In its
resolution, the House of Delegates stated that these methods of
organization were acceptable as long as the practice management and ownership duties remained in the hands of licensed
physicians.2" In 1961, the AMA took a leadership role on this
issue. In that year, twelve states passed the first professional
corporation acts based on a prototype statute drafted by the
legal staff of the AMA. 2 '
That same year, the AMA's Judicial Council issued a proclamation stating that "physicians may take advantage of professional association laws and may also ethically do those things,
which are necessary to reap the intended and proper advantage
of such legislation. '22 By 1971, all states authorized physicians
to organize as professional corporations, associations or
partnerships? 3
17. See Andre Hampton, Resurrection of the Prohibitionon the CorporatePractice
of Medicine: Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 489, 497 (1998).
18. See 17 BERRIEN C. EATON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS, § 8.05[1] (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1992).
19. See id. at § 8.05-8.07.
20. See id.
21. See id. at § 9.01.
22. See id. at § 8.05[1].
23. See id. 17B at § 19.01[2].
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During 1968 and 1969, the AMA surveyed state medical societies regarding their positions on professional corporations.24
This survey asked whether or not the societies favored the practice and whether or not they had promulgated rules on the issue.
Five of forty-seven responding state medical societies reported
ruling on the issue. Of those that ruled, one opposed professional corporations but four ruled in their favor. 25 However, almost half of the state societies responded in favor of the idea of
permitting the corporate practice of medicine. In a follow-up
survey completed in 1974, there was little change on the
subject.26
In 1977, the AMA Judicial Council issued Opinion 4.61, authorizing physicians to form professional service corporations
and associations if formation was consistent with the laws of
state in which they practiced. 27 Opinion 4.61 required that professional service corporations and their physician employees observe the Principles of Medical Ethics applicable to individual
physicians. Finally, Opinion 4.61 required that the ownership
and management of these professional corporations remain in
the hands of licensed physicians.28
The issue of fee splitting evolved along a concurrent path. Initially, the AMA opposed any form of fee splitting. However,
between 1946 and 1963, the AMA softened its position. 29 At
first, it took the position that the division of income among the
members of a group must be associated with the services and
contributions of the group's members. The AMA considered
profit-sharing plans including lay employees as unethical. However, in 1964, the AMA Judicial Council modified their position
as follows:
A retirement plan classified under the Internal Revenue Code
which also covers lay employees and which provides that the
contribution made by a solo practitioner, a group of physicians, or a professional corporation will be based on a percentage of compensation of the participants is ethically acceptable
even though the contribution: (1) is limited to a percentage of
net income before taxes or (2) is payable only when net income exceeds a specified amount.3 °
24.
25.
26.
27.

See
See
See
See

28.

See id.

29.
30.

See RODWIN, supra note 2, at 35.
See Eaton, supra note 18.

Eaton, supra note 18, at § 8.05[2].
id.
id.
id. at § 8.05[1].
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This position is now liberally construed to mean that almost any
type of pension, profit-sharing or other retirement plan is now
ethically acceptable. 3 '
The current position of the American Medical Association on
fee splitting is expressed as follows:
Fee-splitting arrangements between physicians and other independent practitioners in which payment is made merely for
referral of patients are unethical; State boards of medical examiners are encouraged to address this significant issue and
deal appropriately with those physicians in their jurisdictions
who are involved in these unethical, and often times illegal,
practices.32
This expression by the AMA is consistent with the Florida Second District Court of Appeals in Practice Management Associates, Inc. v. Blickensderfer, which differentiated a fee allocation
based upon services from a fee split for a mere patient referral,3 3
but it is inconsistent with the declaratory statements of the Florida Board of Medicine.
B. American Osteopathic Association
In 1970, the General Counsel of the American Osteopathic
Association ("AOA") issued an opinion addressing the increase
in the corporate practice of medicine by osteopathic physicians
and other professionals. The General Counsel opined that because almost seventy percent of osteopaths engaged in a fulltime general practice, as opposed to twenty-two percent of medical doctors, the trend toward group practice by osteopathic
34
physicians would not be as great as among medical doctors.
In this opinion, the General Counsel further noted problems
of unethical fee splitting in the corporate practice of medicine.
The General Counsel reasoned that if the AOA Ethics Committee were called upon at that time to render an opinion, there
might be some variation in opinion regarding whether additional compensation that does not reflect fees earned by the
physician results in fee splitting. He opined that this disparity
could have been accounted for by the Committee's varying per31. See id.
32. 1998 AMA Policy Compendium H-140.991 (Res. 89, A-86; Reaffirmed: CEJA
Rep. A, 1-88) (emphasis added).
33. See Practice Mgmt. Assoc.'s, Inc. v. Blickensderfer, 630 So.2d 1147, 1148 (Fla.
2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
34. See Eaton, supra note 18, § 8.06[1].
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spective concerning the increase in corporate practice by profes35
sionals and the advance of different methods of payment.
In 1972, the AOA Ethics Committee issued a ruling holding
that paying a radiologist employed by a professional corporation
a percentage of his fees plus his expenses did not involve improper fee splitting even though his remaining fees were distributed among the other member-employees of the professional
corporation.36
In 1978, the AOA Ethics Committee issued a ruling interpreting Sections nineteen through twenty-two of the AOA Code of
Ethics. That document concluded that the group practice of
medicine does not violate the AOA Code of Ethics if the division of income among the members is based on the relative
value of the professional services and other services and contributions provided by the respective members to the group.37
Today, Section twelve of the AOA Code of Ethics is consistent with that 1978 ruling. It states that any fee charged by a
physician shall compensate the physician for services actually
rendered and there shall be no division of professional fees for
referrals of patients. 38 The position of the AOA is also consistent with the position of the Florida Second District Court of
Appeals expressed above.39
C. American Dental Association

In 1968, the Judicial Council of the American Dental Association ("ADA") explained that The Principles of Ethics of the
American Dental Association did not include a policy position

on professional corporations, but did allow reasonable arrangements involving partnerships and office sharing. 40 Because the
document failed to explicitly prohibit professional corporations,
some practitioners viewed the practice as permitted. However,
Section nine of the 1968 Principles of Ethics prohibited fee splitting by dentists, defining prohibited fee splitting as any fee
agreement between dentists that is not disclosed to the patient.4'
A survey conducted by the ADA in 1968 revealed that several
state dental societies showed a significant interest in profes35.

See id.

36. See id.
37. See id at § 8.06[2].
38. See AM. OsTEoPATmc Ass'N CODE OF Ermcs § 12 (1996).
39. See Blickensderfer, 630 So. 2d at 1148.
40. See Eaton, supra note 18, at § 8.07[2].
41. See id.
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sional corporations. During those years, the Michigan, Colorado and Missouri societies issued rulings favorable to the
42
corporate practice of dentistry, while Arizona prohibited it.
Currently, Section nine of the ADA Code of Professional
Conduct states that dentists have a duty to be fair in their dealings with patients, colleagues and society. Advisory Opinion six
of Section nine explicitly prohibits dentists from accepting or
tendering rebates or splitting fees.43
D. American Podiatric Medical Association
The Code of Ethics of the American Podiatric Association explicitly prohibits fee splitting, excluding from its definition of fee
splitting the division of fees within a partnership. Section 0 of
the Code of Ethics states:
It is unethical for a podiatrist to pay or accept commissions in
any form or manner on fees for professional services, references, consultations, pathology reports, radiograms, prescriptions, or on other services or articles supplied to patients.
Division of professional fees or acceptance of rebates from
fees paid by patients to x-ray, clinical or other laboratories,
shoe stores, or other commercial establishments is unethical.
It is unethical for a podiatrist to pay for the recommendation
of patients. The division of revenue in a partnership is outside
the scope and application of this rule."
E.

The Continuing Conflict

By 1971, all fifty states permitted professional corporations. 45
Today, several states, including Florida, Alaska, Connecticut,
Delaware and Indiana, have no prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine regardless of whether the corporation
is a professional or non-professional entity.46 For example, in
Florida, the Board of Medicine has repeatedly ruled that Florida
law permits the corporate ownership of medical practices. In
those rulings, the Board found it acceptable for non-physicians,
including corporations, natural persons and other legal entities,
42.

See id. at § 8.07[3].

43.

See id. at § 8.07[2] at n.44-45.

44.
45.
46.

AM. PODIATRIC MED. ASS'N. CODE OF ETHIcs

§ 2(o) (1996).
See Eaton, supra note 18, at § 9.01.
See D. Cameron Dobbins, Survey of Laws Relating to the Corporate Practice
of Medicine, 9 No. 5 HEALTH LAW 18 (1977).
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol8/iss1/10
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to own medical practices and employ physicians.47 However, a
number of states, including California, Texas, Arizona, Illinois
and Idaho, still prohibit the practice of medicine by "regular"
non-professional corporations, partnerships and other legal
entities.48
Despite growing liberalization with regard to corporate practice and employee profit sharing, the regulatory boards continued to oppose fee splitting between a physician and a layman or
between independent physicians. This position has been justified under the principle that physician judgment could be impeded by financial considerations. Many feel that fee splitting is
unethical and may interfere with the physician-patient relationship.49 Others contend that fee splitting may cause physicians to
over-utilize services in order to increase fees.5 ° These positions
notwithstanding, in states where the corporate practice of
medicine has been authorized, regulation has not prohibited
non-physician corporate owners from sharing in the corporation's earnings even though those earnings represented, at least
in part, the fees generated by employed physicians.
Today, the distinction between corporate ownership of a medical practice and traditional fee splitting still confronts practitioners and regulators. The issue was recently addressed by the
Florida Board of Medicine in its Answer Brief in the Board's
appeal of the PhyMatrix Management, Inc. v. Magan L.
Bakaraniacase. In describing its interpretation that a management contract paid on a percentage basis constitutes an inappropriate fee split, the Board stated:
PhyMatrix suggests to the court that its agreement is simply
the corporate practice of medicine with a different 'structure.'
It is in fact this difference in structure that distinguishes this
agreement from the corporate practice of medicine. In the
corporate practice of medicine, the corporation owns the medical practice and carries all the liabilities and responsibilities of
ownership. The owner-corporation legally employs physicians
and at the end of business retains its corporate earnings. The
47. See, e.g., Conrad Goulet, M.D., 15 F.A.L.R. 4184 (1989); John W. Lister, M.D.,
9 F.A.L.R. 6299 (1987).
48. See Dobbins, supra note 46; but see Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr.,
179 Ill.2d 1 (1997) (recognizing that the Illinois Medical Practice Act contains no ex-

press prohibition on the corporate employment of physicians and rationalizing that
hospital corporations are authorized by other laws to provide medical treatment to
patients, the court ruled that licensed hospitals may directly employ physicians).
49. See Eaton, supra note 18, at § 8.05[1].
50. See id.
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PhyMatrix agreement seeks to avoid ownership, but still provides PhyMatrix a share of the earnings.5 1
The Board draws a distinction between fee splitting among
members and employees of a corporation and fee splitting between professionals and third-party contractors. Unfortunately,
there is a profound lack of clarity in the definition used by the
Board, which fails to distinguish between the use of fees to pay
for legitimate business services from the use of fees to pay for
patient referrals.

II.

LACK OF CLARITY - DEFINITION

Most states have enacted legislation or rules prohibiting physician fee splitting and other payments for referrals.2 However,
referral and fee split are rarely defined in the fee split context.
A.

What is a "PatientReferral?"

Though state laws usually lack a definition of referral, the
term is defined under the regulations accompanying the Social
Security Act as follows:
* The request by a physician for an item or service for which
payment may be made under Medicare Part B, including the
request by a physician for a consultation with another physician [and any test or procedure ordered by, or to be performed by (or under the supervision of) that other
physician].
* The request or establishment of a plan of care by a physician
that includes the furnishing of designated health services.5 3
In its 1998 proposed "Stark II" regulations, however, the
Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") adopts the
view that a referral to oneself is a referral:
Section 1877(a)(1) prohibits a physician from referring Medicare patients for the furnishing of designated health services to
an entity with which the physician (or an immediate family
member) has a financial relationship, unless an exception applies. The statute encompasses any entity that provides designated health services, without qualifications or limits. We
51. Brief for Appellee, PhyMatrix Mgmt., Inc. v. Magan L. Bakarania, M.D., No.
97-4543 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. filed Apr. 17, 1998).
52. See, e.g., State v. Abortion Info. Agency, Inc., 323 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1971); see also Robert M. McNair, Jr., Selected Issues in Forming and Operating
Health Care Joint Ventures, 371 PL/Comm 9, 58 (1985); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 650 (West 1998).
53. 63 Fed. Reg. 1659, 1690 (1998).
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attempted to reflect the breadth of the concept in the August
1995 final rule at § 411.351, where we defined an "entity" as a
sole proprietorship, trust, corporation, partnership, foundation, not-for-profit corporation, or unincorporated association.
...
We wish to clarify that we regard an individual physician
or group of physicians as referring to an "entity" when they
refer to themselves, or among themselves. The concept of a
"referral" under section 1877(h)(5)(A) and (B) covers the request by a physician for an item or service under Part B, or the
request or establishment of a plan of care by a physician that
includes the provision of a designated health service. This statutory definition does not exclude in-office referrals, nor does it
specify that a referral occurs only when a physician refers to an
outside entity.5 4
HCFA's approach does little to define a prohibited "referral"
for fee-split purposes. The search for a definition is also exacerbated by judicial interpretations of the federal anti-kickback
statute. The courts have adopted the government's position that
the anti-kickback statute prohibits arrangements in which any
one purpose of the remuneration is for referral of services or to
induce further services.55
B.

What is a Fee Split?

Similarly lacking is a definition of fee split that distinguishes a
payment for patient referrals from a payment for professional
services. Under either HCFA's definition that a self-referral is a
referral, or the one purpose rule adopted by some courts under
the federal anti-kickback statutes, 56 any payment intended to induce referrals is potentially illegal.
Consider HCFA's view that such common business practices
as hospitals providing parking for physician staff members may
constitute illegal payment for referrals. The proposed Stark II
regulations provide:
We have also been asked about parking spaces that a hospital
provides to physicians who have privileges to treat their patients in the hospital. It is our view that, while a physician is
making rounds, the parking benefits - both the hospital and its
patients, rather than providing the physician with any personal
benefit. Thus, we do not intend to regard parking for this pur54. 63 Fed. Reg. at 1685.
55. See, e.g., OIG Advisory Opinion 98-4, supra note 8 (citing U.S. v. Kats, 871
F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989).)
56. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3rd Cir. 1985); United States v. Kats, 871
F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989).
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pose as remuneration furnished by the hospital to the physician, but instead as part of the physician's privileges.
However, if a hospital provides parking to a physician for periods of time that do not coincide with his
57 or her rounds, that
parking could constitute remuneration.
With a similarly unsettling broad brush, consider Florida's
Board of Medicine view that a global fee split is an illegal fee
split, expressed at its April 1998 board meeting:
The Board voted to issue an opinion letter regarding certain
financial arrangements between specialists and imaging centers. The Board stated that an arrangement which calls for the
specialist to refer patients to an imaging center, then receive a
portion of the global fee for performing the read of the study,
is prohibited by law. The Board referred the matter to their
Rules Committee for development of clarifying language.5"
As of the date of this writing, the Rules Committee has not
issued a rule.
The Florida statute interpreted by the Board of Medicine was
adopted in 1979. Section 458.331(1)(i) of the Florida Statutes
provides that the Board of Medicine has the authority to discipline a physician for:
...paying or receiving any commission, bonus, kickback, or
rebate, or engaging in any split-fee arrangement in any form
whatsoever with a physician, organization, agency or person
either directly or indirectly, for patients referred... for health

care goods and services .... 59
Similar statutes apply to each of Florida's professional health
care licensure classifications. A related Florida statute makes it
a crime to:
. . .offer or pay any commission, bonus, rebate, kickback, or
bribe, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind, or engage in any
split-fee arrangement, in any form whatsoever, to induce the
referral of patients or patronage from a health care provider
or health care facility.6'
Court interpretations of the Florida fee-splitting statutes are
sparse. Most of the interpretations have come from the Board
of Medicine and other regulatory bodies. The only cases on this
subject are a series of related cases from the Florida Second District Court of Appeal. The Second District addressed fee split57. 63 Fed. Reg. at 1715.
58. Florida Board of Medicine Summary of Actions (last modified Oct. 13, 1998)
<http://www.fmaonline.org.>.
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(1)(i) (West 1998).
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.505(1) (West 1998).
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol8/iss1/10
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ting in a series of cases relating to a Florida chiropractic practice
management company, Practice Management Associates. 6 '
However, the chiropractic fee-splitting statute is identical to the
Florida fee-splitting statute applicable to physicians.62
The court found that a percentage-fee arrangement in which
Practice Management Associates provided services to chiropractors in Illinois and Minnesota did not violate Illinois, Minnesota
or Florida law. The court interpreted "splitting fees" under the
statute ". . . in the traditional meaning of dividing a professional
fee with another person, professional or non-professional, for
the referral of patients. ' 63 The court held that marketing efforts
of Practice Management Associates did not amount to a referral
of patients; thus, there was no fee split between the company
and the chiropractors. 64 The court distinguished compensation
paid for the division of services from a division of fees paid for
mere patient referrals in a companion case.65 The division of
fees, it held, is legal, but the payment for referrals is illegal.
In its published April 1998 board minutes referred to above,
the Florida Board of Medicine did not explain the reasoning behind its holding that a division of a global fee is illegal.66
Clearly, the Board did not follow the Second District's distinction between a division of fees for services performed and fee
splits for the mere referral of a patient. The Florida Board of
Medicine clearly rejected the opinion of the Florida Second Dis67
trict Court of Appeals in its briefs filed in Bakarania.
The Board's view that a division of a global fee for services
rendered is an illegal fee split overlooks business reality. For
the most part, physicians have not sought global fees. Global
fees have been pressed upon the health care system by managed
care plans, not physicians or patients. Global fees result because of the bargaining power of managed care payers who insist on paying providers global fees with the caveat: "You
61. Practice Mgmt. Assoc.'s., Inc. v. Gulley, 618 So.2d 259 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 460.413(1)(k) (West 1998).
63. PracticeMgmt. Assoc.'s., 618 So.2d at 260.
64. See Practice Mgmt. Assoc.'s., 618 So. 2d 259; Practice Mgmt. Assoc.'s v. Orman, 614 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Practice Mgmt. Assoc.'s, Inc. v.
Blickensderfer, 630 So. 2d 1147, 1148 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1993).

65.

See Blickensderfer at 1148.

66. See Florida Board of Medicine Summary of Actions (last modified Oct. 13,
1998) <http://www.fmaonline.org.>.
67. Brief for Appellee, PhyMatrix Mgmt., Inc. v. Magan L. Bakarania, M.D., No.
97-4543 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. filed Apr. 17, 1998).
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provide the entire service for the global fee and you split up the
fee between service providers." The result is a fee allocation
among providers and a fee split for services rendered demanded
by the payers with superior bargaining power who monitor results by utilization review and quality control procedures.
Physician Practice Management Companies ("PPMC"), such
as PhyMatrix or Practice Management Associates, do not refer
patients. They arrange business contracts - including managed
care contracts with hard-nosed, bottom-line oriented managedcare customers who insist on tough contracts monitored by utilization review and quality control systems.
Today's rapid reorganization of laissez-faire medical practices
into financially and professionally managed clinics is demanded
by the market place. Physicians who cannot compete economically and professionally and who do not join provider networks
cannot differentiate themselves from competitors and may find
themselves out of business. Survival demands that professional
skills be augmented with organization, capital, marketing and
sophisticated management-elements not present in the typical
medical practice. Contractual services like those provided by
PPMCs are becoming necessary for survival. Paying for those
services on a percentage basis is good business because payment
is performance-based.68
Interestingly, a RAND Journal of Economics study published
almost two decades ago examined the welfare effects of fee
splitting paid by one physician to another. The study concluded:
..inthe principal-agent context it is possible for fee splitting
to offer incentives which actually improve patient welfare. Fee
splitting occurs when there is a divergence between price and
the referral partner's marginal opportunity cost. . . . It is
shown that fee splitting may induce the first-contact physician
to refer instead of performing a lower quality procedure
himself. .... 69

68. See JOHN W. RANSOM & JAMES J. KUMPLE, PHYSICIAN PRACrICE MANAGEMENT: FINDING VALUE THROUGH Focus, CASH FLOWS, AND CAPrrAL EFFICIENCY
(1998). California permits a percentage management fee based upon gross receipts.

See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 650 (West 1998). New York permits fixed fees. See
Edward S.Kornreich & Ellen H. Moskowitz, Managed Care: Fee Splitting Faces Obstacles in New York, N.Y.L.J. 5 '(col. 3) (1997).
69. Mark V. Pauly, The Ethics and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting, 10
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 344-52 (1979) <http://www.rje.org. /abstracts/abstracts/1979/Spring_1979>.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol8/iss1/10

14

1999]

Jacobs and Goodman: Splitting Fees or Splitting Hairs? Fee Splitting and Health Care

Splitting Fees or Splitting Hairs?

Thus, what is missing is a fee-splitting definition distinguishing
between legitimate fee allocations and payments for services
from payments for mere referrals.
III.

FLORIDA BOARD OF MEDICINE ON FEE SPLITTING

The Florida Board of Medicine has issued a series of opinions
related to fee splitting. However, before examining Board of
Medicine decisions, it is necessary to review the scope of authority delegated by the legislature to an administrative agency
charged with statutory interpretation and enforcement.
A.

Florida'sAdministrative Agency Authority

to impose rules unless granted
" No agency has the authority
70
legislation.
by
the authority
" An agency may interpret statutes through practice, agency
rules or as issued in a declaratory statement. However, the
administrative interpretation of the statute must be consistent
with the legislative intent of the statute:
A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not sufficient
to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law to be implemented is also required. An agency may adopt only rules that
implement, interpret, or make specific the particular powers
and duties granted by the enabling statute. No agency shall
have authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably
related to the purpose of the enabling legislation and is not
arbitrary and capricious, nor shall an agency have the authority to implement statutory provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy. Statutory language. granting
rulemaking authority or generally describing the powers and
functions of an agency shall be construed to extend no further
than the particular powers and duties conferred by the same
statute.71
* If the legislature has granted rulemaking power to an administrative agency, that grant must be accompanied by identifiable
standards governing its exercise, so that the power to make
the law is not unlawfully delegated.72
" Agencies are given wide discretion in the interpretation of
statutes they administer. The agency's interpretation need
70. See Department of Envtl. Reg. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 424 So. 2d
787 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
71. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.536(1) (West 1998); Cataract Surgery Ctr. v. Health
Care Cost Containment Bd., 581 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
72. See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
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not be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of interpretations.
However, an agency's interpretation will be rejected when it
"has no basis either in the statute, rules
of the agency, sound
73
sense.
common
or
business practices,
" Although a court must follow the agency's interpretation
rather than the court's preferred interpretation, the discretion
of an agency is "somewhat more limited where the statute being interpreted authorizes sanctions or penalties against a person's professional license. Statutes providing for the
revocation or suspension of a license to practice are deemed
punitive in nature and must be strictly construed,
with any
74
licensee.
the
of
favor
in
interpreted
ambiguity
" An agency rule or interpretation cannot enlarge, modify, or
contravene the provisions of law it implements, nor can it implement a statutory provision stating only general legislative
intent. Implementation must be of specific statutory
provisions.75
" An agency may issue a declaratory statement only on the "applicability of a statutory provision, or of any rule or order of
the agency, as it applies to the petitioner's particular set of
circumstances. '76 If the declaratory statement has the potential for affecting the "substantial interests of persons other
than the petitioners" it has the effect of a rule, and the declaratory statement procedure cannot be used.77
Having described the scope of administrative authority
granted to the Board of Medicine, it is important to recall the
scope of this authority when evaluating the Board's various decisions. As indicated above, the Florida Board of Medicine has
issued a series of opinions related to fee splitting. These opinions can be classified into five issue-based categories:
1. employment agreements;
2. independent contractor relationships;
73. Turnberry Isle Resort & Club v. Fernandez, 666 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 2nd Dist.
Ct. App. 1996).
74. Elmariah v. Department of Prof'l Reg., Bd.of Med., 574 So. 2d 164, 165 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
75. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.52(8) (West 1998); see also § 120.536(1); Cataract
Surgery Ctr., 581 So. 2d 1359.
76. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 120.565(1) (West 1998).
77. Florida Optometric Assoc. v. Dept. of Prof'l Reg., Board of Opticianry, 567
So. 2d 928, 936 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1990). We note that this argument is made in PhyMatrix Mgmt., Inc. v. Magan L. Bakarania, M.D., Case 97-4543, filed Apr. 17, 1998, (1st
D.C.A. pending) by the appellants.
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3. management contracts between physicians and other
entities;
4. leases; and
5. equipment and facilities ownership.
B.

Employment Arrangements

The fee-split issues raised by the compensation of an employed physician were addressed by the Board of Medicine in In
re: The Petition for Declaratory Statement of C. Robert Crow,
M.D.78 In Crow, a physician sold his practice to a corporation
and continued to work for the corporation as an employee. He
was paid on a flat salary basis. Dr. Crow sought a declaratory
statement from the Board of Medicine regarding a proposed
change in his compensation arrangement. Under the proposal,
he would receive a base salary plus thirty-five percent of all
practice revenues generated during the previous year by him or
by individuals under his supervision and forty percent of all
practice revenues in excess of a certain target level. The Board
held that both the salary arrangement and the bonus, which was
based, in part, upon fees generated from referrals by the physician for ancillary services, constituted a prohibited fee split. The
Board went on to state that if the arrangement were limited
solely to fees generated by the physician from his own professional services and those services provided by individuals under
his own direct supervision, without reliance on fees generated
from ancillary services, the arrangement would be legal.
This case was later affirmed by the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Crow v. Agency for Health Care Administration. In affirming the Board's ruling, the court discussed the Board's
motivation in prohibiting physicians from receiving payment
based on ancillary revenues, stating:
It is... clear that the Board was concerned with the possibility
that an employee physician's medical judgment might be
skewed where that physician benefits financially from overutilization of ancillary tests and services even if performed by
[the acquiring corporation].79
A careful analysis of Crow raises several questions. For instance, Florida's fee-splitting statute does not define fee split78. In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of C. Robert Crow, M.D., 17
F.A.L.R. 2568 (1995).
79. Crow v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 669 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1996).
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ting, and particularly, does not distinguish between fees earned
from ancillary services and personal services. 80
Did the Board of Medicine exceed its authority by making
new law? Did it use its declaratory statement as disguised rule
making? The Fifth District Court of Appeals seemed to give
deference to the Board of Medicine's interpretation because the
holding does not apply to proprietors and partners. If the Board
has the authority to prohibit physicians from being paid for ancillary revenues, the statute would say so and the prohibition
would apply to all physicians, not just employed physicians. The
Board, however, has not been granted such authority and the
statute does not say so. We suggest instead that the Board's position established an unreasonable classification among business
entities.
Crow provides that an employed physician can be paid productivity compensation from professional services but not from
ancillary services.8 ' What happens to compensation for ancillary
services? The compensation belongs to the owner of the practice. In Florida, the owner of the practice may be a physician in fact the physician rendering the ancillary services - or any
other person. Thus, if the physician practices as a proprietorship, the physician retains ancillary service revenues as proprietorship earnings. If the physician practices as a limited liability
company or general partnership, the earnings are retained as
partnership earnings and distributions. If the physician is the
sole owner of a professional corporation, the ancillary service
revenues are retained as corporate earnings or distributed as Scorporation profits. In any case, the physician is legally paid ancillary service revenues.
The Board of Medicine's approach, which has the effect of a
rule, creates an unreasonable classification. It prohibits ancillary service compensation being paid to employed physicians. It
cannot, and does not, deny proprietor and partner physicians
the revenue from ancillary services. The deference that the
Fifth District granted the Board of Medicine's concern about
utilization abuse is beyond the authority granted the Board in
the enabling legislation. 82
The Court also fails to understand the distinction in organizational form and the limits of authority of the Board of Medicine.
80.
81.

82.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(1)(i) (West 1998).
See Crow, 669 So. 2d 1160, 62.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(1)(i) (West 1998).
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There is no statutory authority for the distinction. If statutory
authority existed, it most likely would create an unreasonable
classification, since a classification prohibiting compensation to
employees but not partners, proprietors or owners does not necessarily have anything to do with the health, safety or welfare of
the people of Florida.
For several years, the Internal Revenue Service challenged
the form of business organizations, creating "corporate tests"
and "non-corporate" tests to determine taxation. Recently, the
IRS has come to the conclusion that form versus substance was
not a game it should play. The IRS has issued its "check-a-box"
regulations, providing latitude for taxpayers in determining their
business form without regard to taxation effect.8 3 The logic discovered by the IRS should be applied in health care regulation
as well.
HCFA has attempted such an approach in its Stark II proposed regulations. HCFA proposes to preclude group practice
physicians from being compensated for designated self-referred
health services. HCFA would permit designated health service
compensation when the services are performed after a referral
from another physician. HCFA permits designated health service revenues to be distributed as part of the general profit
share. But, alas, HCFA's regulations are limited to group practice physicians and do not deal with services performed by
proprietors. 84
The Crow decision and HCFA's proposed Stark II regulations
that prohibit ancillary service revenues to physicians discourage
formation of group practices, contrary to the requirements of
today's health care environment. Because, for instance,
pulmonologists, radiologists and cardiologists who perform ancillary services, including designated health services, can be
compensated for these services as proprietors, they have no incentive to join groups or to become employed when ancillary
service compensation as an employee or group practice member
is restricted. As soon as lawyers advise these specialists that
they must give up their ancillary revenues when they join a
group practice, their interest in such activities naturally
disappears.
83. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to § 301.7701-3 (1998); see also Terence F. Cuff,
Impact of the New Proposedand Final Check-The-Box Regulations on PartnershipTax
Status, 15 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 99 (1998).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (West 1998); 63 Fed. Reg. 1659 (1998).
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In the case In re: Petitionfor DeclaratoryStatement of George
G. Levy, the Board addressed an arrangement under which Dr.
Levy employed a radiologist on a part time basis to provide professional interpretation of MRIs conducted on Dr. Levy's patients. The radiologist was paid on a "per read" basis. That
payment was some amount less than the full professional service
fee paid to the practice for the interpretation provided by the
radiologist. The Board declared the payment to violate section
458.331(1)(i) of the Florida Statutes, stating:
The Board of Medicine finds that Dr. Levy's retention of any
portion of the professional fees billed for reading and interpreting scans and studies performed on his patients, without
Dr. Levy actually performing any professional services is a
"split-fee" arrangement and therefore prohibited by
458.331(1)(i) Fla. Stat.86
However, in the Levy case, the patients for whom services
were rendered were Dr. Levy's patients and he owned the practice. In addition, the radiologist was an employee of Dr. Levy
and Dr. Levy retained responsibility for the actions the radiologist, including malpractice responsibility. Furthermore, Dr.
Levy owned the office space and equipment, and billed for services performed, including operational and administrative
expenses.
In its ruling, the Board failed to attribute any value to these
activities or to the non-professional services provided. The
Board's decisions in Crow and Levy conflict with its own rulings
that permit the corporate practice of medicine and conflict with
cases such as In re: The Petition for Declaratory Statement of
John W. Lister.87 In Lister, the Board held that Florida law does
not prohibit a duly licensed medical doctor from practicing as an
employee of a corporation. Thus, it is the corporate owner, not
the employed physician, who owns the practice, accepts patients,
determines what fees will be charged, and sets the compensation
for services rendered. The corporate owner is the party who is
entitled to the profits from services rendered by its employees.
Simply put, if the medical practice, its patients and accounts
receivable are owned by an employer authorized to own a medical practice, the employed physician is not splitting fees. The
85. See In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of George G. Levy, M.D., Final
Order No. AHCA-97-0495 (1997).
86.

Id.

87. In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of John W. Lister, M.D., 9 F.A.L.R.
6299 (1987).
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owner already owns the fees and the physician employee is entitled to nothing but compensation for services rendered. If the
physician provides unnecessary medical services, the Board of
Medicine has the power to discipline him, but the payment by
the corporation for legitimate services is not a fee split for the
referral of patients; the fee split is a legitimate payment for services. According to the Board's own rulings, the patients belong
to the practice owner, not the physician employed by the practice. If this were not true, corporate employers could not enjoin
physicians from competition after employment terminates. 88
Ironically, the Board takes the position that a professional
practice owner is entitled to compensation for the risks of ownership in its appellate briefs filed in the PhyMatrix case we
noted previously.8 9 The Board's position is worth noting here.
PhyMatrix suggests to the court that its agreement is simply the
corporate practice of medicine with a different 'structure.' It is
in fact this difference in structure that distinguishes this agreement from the corporate practice of medicine. In the corporate
practice of medicine, the corporation owns the medical practice
and carries all the liabilities and responsibilities of ownership.
The owner-corporation legally employs physicians and at the
end of business retains its corporate earnings. The PhyMatrix
agreement seeks to avoid ownership, but still provides PhyMatrix a share of the earnings. 90
Medicare recognizes that practice owners own accounts receivable for professional services rendered. 91 Florida law also
recognizes practice ownership, as distinguished from physician
ownership, of patient charts and records. 92 Because of the inconsistencies, the Board of Medicine decisions in Crow and
Levy are contrary to logic, statutory law and its own rulings.
C. Independent ContractorArrangements
In the case In re: The Petition for Declaratory Statement of
Edmund G. Lundy, M.D., the Board addressed a situation in
which a physician engaged a corporation as an independent con88. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 1998).
89. Brief for Appellee, PhyMatrix Mgmt., Inc. v. Magan L. Bakarania, M.D., No.
97-4543 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. filed Apr. 17, 1998).
90. Id. at 7.
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(u)(b)(6) (West 1998).
92. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.011 (West 1998).
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tractor.93 The corporation provided the physician with office
space, advertising, billing and administrative services. The physician's fees were paid directly to the corporation. In exchange
for the services rendered, the corporation retained forty percent
of the physician's fees, paying the physician the other sixty percent. The Board of Medicine ruled that this was not a fee split
but "simply a charge for services rendered," because there was
no referral relationship between the company and the
physician.94
However, the Board held that an additional arrangement
under which the company was to be paid a percentage of the
physician's fees for the referral of patients within a network de95
veloped by the company did constitute a prohibited fee split.
The Board's concern over this arrangement centered on the fact
that the percentage fee was only paid if both the referring physician and the receiving physician were members of the company's network. If, on the other hand, the referral came from
someone out-of-network, or an in-network physician made a referral to an out-of-network specialist, no fee was due. The
Board held that because of the disparity between in and out-ofreferrals, the arrangement constituted a prohibited fee
network
96
split.

The Board also addressed the independent contractor status
of a physician in In re: Petitionfor DeclaratoryStatement of Gary
R. Johnson M.D. and the Green Clinic.97 Under the arrange-

ment, the Clinic provided the physician with supplies, support
staff, equipment and billing services. However, the physician
maintained control over his professional services and the
amount of the fees charged. Compensation was divided between the physician and the Clinic, with the physician receiving
forty-six percent of the fees charged and the Clinic receiving
fifty-four percent. The Board found this arrangement constituted a prohibited fee split because the Clinic was to receive the
fifty-four percent of billings
for services performed both within
98
and outside of the Clinic.
93. See In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Edmund G. Lundy, M.D., 9
F.A.L.R. 6289, 6293 (1987).
94. See id. at 6292.
95. See id. at 6293-94.
96. See id. at 6293.
97. See In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Gary R. Johnson, M.D., 15
F.A.L.R. 3935 (1992).
98. See id. at 3937.
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Often organizations use revenue from various sources to measure compensation. Negotiated compensation between independent parties usually results in fair market value for
services provided. Carrying the Board of Medicine's view to its
logical conclusion, the Clinic could have charged sixty percent
from Clinic revenues and zero percent from outside revenues,
for example. This mix may have produced the same compensation as the formula found unlawful. Again, it appears the Medical Board reached beyond its statutory authority.
The petition also fails to clarify how the payment of a fee for
management services is in fact a payment for referrals, which is
the only issue the Board has the legal authority to regulate. The
holding reflects the need for clearer statutory definition as to
when a fee allocation is a fee split or a payment for services. 99
The case of In re: The Petition for Declaratory Statement of

Paul B. Speiller, M.D., addressed a similar arrangement. 100 In
that case, Dr. Speiller owned a medical clinic organized to engage physicians as independent contractors. Under the independent contractor agreements, the Clinic provided
consultation rooms, equipment, labs, nurses, technicians and
other attendants and administrative staff. The patients receiving
services at the Clinic would "belong to the Clinic" and the Clinic
billed for all services provided to Clinic patients by the independent contractors both at the Clinic and at area hospitals.
Unlike the Green case, in Speiller the Clinic set the fees for all
services rendered and the physicians were paid a flat fee per
procedure. In addition, physicians who served as independent
contractors at the Clinic were allowed to maintain separate,
outside independent practices, the patients of which would belong to the physician and not to the Clinic. The Board also
found this arrangement constituted an improper fee split be99. See Department of Prof'l Reg. v. Pedro Daniel Cedre, M.D., 91-10552 (1992).
The complaint alleged that the physician provided eye examinations and medical
treatment at the optical shop and assigned ("signed over") his fee payments to the
shop engaged in a split fee arrangement. The physician was paid 50% of fees. A
consent decree was entered into in which the physician paid a fine and admitted no
wrongdoing. See also In re: Declaratory Statement of Warren L. Simmonds D.P.M.,
10 F.A.L.R. 597 (1987) (wherein the Board of Podiatric Medicine found that a pay-

ment to a podiatric physician of $100 for tests performed on his patients was a kickback or fee split under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 461.013(1)0) (1998)).
100. See In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Paul B. Speiller, M.D., 14
F.A.L.R. 3942 (1991).
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cause, as in Green, the Clinic sought to bill for services provided
to Clinic patients both within and outside the Clinic. 1° 1
The Office of Inspector General considers Medicare-related
compensation arrangements between contractors in a different
light than compensation arrangements with employees. Giving
little credence to the long-standing respondeatsuperior body of
common law holding a principal responsible for an agent, the
OIG views percentage contracts with independent contractors
as suspect. The OIG sees independent contractors as less accountable than employees, 10 2 but cites no authority or study for
its position.
In OIG Advisory Opinion 98-10, cited above, HCFA advised
that a commission payable to a manufacturer representative for
sale of diapers and other items to a hospital is subject to the
federal anti-kickback statute. The OIG advised it would not
take action since the commission was fair market value and
there was no indication of referrals. A similar result was
reached by Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeals in a case
involving a commission due to Medical Development Network,
10 3
Inc., for its promotion of durable medical equipment sales
that were reimbursed by Medicare. The court held that the
commission was not due and payable. 1°4
Because the anti-kickback statutes have an exception for
compensation paid to employees, 05 the illegal result expressed
in the OIG opinion and by the Florida court only occurs when
the promotion is by independent contractors. As a result, one
must question whether this outcome is logical.
D. Management Contracts

The Board's management contract opinions divide between
those that provide for straight management services and those
that provide for management services including marketing or
network creation. The Board has concluded that percentage
management fees under a management agreement are illegal
101. See id.
102. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35952, 35981 (1991); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 3088, 3093 (1989);
see also OIG Advisory Opinion 98-10 (last updated Mar. 16, 1999) <http://www.hhs.
gov/progorg/oig>.
103. Medical Dev. Network, Inc. v. Professional Respiratory Care/Home Med.
Equip. Serv.'s, Inc., 673 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
104. See id. at 566.
105. See 53 Fed. Reg. 51856, 51860 (1988). This details the safe harbor for employment arrangements.
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when the management company provides marketing, particularly network development services, for the physician or physician practice. The Board equates marketing and network
development (joining health care providers into units of service
under contracts with insurers and other payers) as patient-referral activity. However, the Board's rulings remain inconsistent.
In In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Joseph M.
Zeterberg, M.D., the petitioner sought Board approval for an arrangement under which a corporation bought substantially all of
his practice assets and provided him with practice management
services including office space, equipment, staff, practice supplies, medical transcription and other support services. 10 6 Additionally, the corporation developed a "circuit" of clinics in which
the petitioner provided services. The physician signed a covenant not to compete and was paid the greater of either a floor
amount or a set percentage of revenues plus expenses, with the
corporation retaining the remaining revenues.
The Board of Medicine found this arrangement constituted a
prohibited fee split. The Board distinguished this case from the
facts in Lundy'0 7 because the corporation established and operated a series of offices, the "circuit." The Board found that:
.. the contract does not cover simply an administrative charge
factor, but includes the activities of the company in going out
and marketing allergy care services.... In addition, Petitioner
emphasizes that the fee received by Petitioner is not split with
the clinic directly. However, the fee is split indirectly.
Although none of the fees collected by the specialist would be
shared with the general practitioner, they would be shared
with AAC. The referral occurs by virtue of the fact that the
Corporation develops the "circuit" and arranges
appointments. 0 8
This contrasts with the Board's approach in Department of
Professional Regulation v. Vinger. 0 9 In this case, the Department of Administrative Hearings reviewed and accepted an order of the Board of Medicine. The Board held that a physician
who, through a wholly-owned corporation, arranged for the provision of ancillary health care services to nursing facility resi106. In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Joseph M. Zeterberg, M.D., 12
F.A.L.R. 1035 (1990).
107. In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Edmund G. Lundy, M.D., 9
F.A.L.R. 6289 (1987).
108. In re Zeterberg, 12 F.A.L.R. at 1038.
109. Department of Prof'l Reg. v. Vinger, 13 F.A.L.R. 153 (1990).
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dents did not engage in an inappropriate fee-splitting
arrangement.
In Vinger, the corporation arranged to make ancillary services
available to nursing facility residents. In exchange for facilitating these services, the corporation was paid a percentage of the
performing physician's earnings for the services provided. The
Board found that because the nursing home made the services
available to the residents on a non-exclusive basis, there was no
referral to the physician. The Board ruled:
This percentage was for actual administrative services provided by Health Care Plus to the physician, including advertising the availability of services, making appointments, use of
reception services, providing forms for patients and transcription services, providing assistance to the physicians at the nursing home, providing transportation for patients needing to go
outside the nursing home for care, delivering reports to the
nursing home for each patient seen, and other administrative
services necessary to insure the operation of the program.
Health Care Plus was providing valuable overhead and management services for the percentage it received." 0
The Board made clear that one of the reasons that the arrangement did not constitute a fee split was that the company
was not paid on the basis of services delivered by the participating physicians outside of the nursing facility. The Board went
on:
.. the statute does not prohibit a corporation from providing
administrative services to a physician for percentage fee. To
hold otherwise would be to prohibit HMOs and other similar
arrangements from operating, since patients visiting HMOs
necessarily see physicians working with the HMOs which advertise their services and provide administrative and support
services to the physicians who care for the patients within the
HMO facility. A percentage of the fee the physician is entitled
to by virtue of the services he has rendered to a patient is remitted to the HMO for the administrative and overhead services provided by the corporation. On a smaller scale, the
Respondent's relationship to Health Care Plus and its relationship to nursing home facilities is similar to that of an
HMO, whereby the corporation advertises services, provides
administrative support and collects a portion of the fee that a
physician receives for patient care in order to compensate the
corporation for the services it provides."'
110.
111.

Id. at 158.
Id. at 160.
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However, in the case In re: Petitionfor Declaratory Statement
of Magan L. Bakarania, M.D., the Board stated that a payment
of a percentage management fee is an unlawful fee split under
Florida law:
Although payment of a flat fee in return for the provision of
management services, including practice enhancement, is appropriate and allowable under Florida law, payment of a percentage of the revenue of the management services and
practice enhancement generated is not permissible.112
The PPMC in this case, PhyMatrix, provided:
" general practice management,
* relationships and affiliations with other physicians and specialists, hospitals, networks, health maintenance organizations and preferred provider organizations,
" a provider network, integrating the practice into existing
networks,
* strategic planning,
* coordination of managed care relationships, and
* consultation
about fee schedules and other management
11 3
services.

In addition, PhyMatrix provided the following operational
services:
* billing, collections and bookkeeping,
* employing personnel, facilities and equipment, development
and operation of the ancillary services, and
* financial reporting." 4
PhyMatrix also purchased the practice assets and leased them
back to the physician practice. In exchange, the physicians paid
PhyMatrix the following three-tiered fee:
" an operations fee for the actual third-party expenses incurred in providing the services listed,
" a management fee of $450,000 per year, and
" a performance fee of 30 percent of the group practice's net
income per year from all revenues,115
including ancillary services, supplies and pharmaceuticals.

The Board found:
. . .this agreement which requires petitioner or petitioner's

group practice to pay a specified percentage of their net income without regard to the cost of providing services supplied
112.

In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Magan L. Bakarania, M.D., 20

F.A.L.R. 395 (1997).
113. See id. at 5, 12, 13.
114. See id. at 6, 12, 13.
115. See id. at 6.
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by the company, and without regard to whether the income is
from services performed either by petitioner or under petitioner's supervision or direction is a split fee arrangement that
is in violation of Section 458.3311(i) Florida Statutes. Furthermore, payment of fees to the company, that are based upon
revenue generated, at least in part, because of the referrals
that the company has helped to generate is in.violation of Section 817.505(1)(a) Florida Statutes."1 6

The Board further concluded that establishing networks of
providers and marketing, a passive activity, is equivalent to the
indirect referral of patients. 117 Apparently, the Board sees a difference when an HMO performs the marketing and network activity, as it recognized and permitted in Vinger. The Board did
not deal with whether or not the payment for services is reasonable or represents fair market value. Although this case was appealed, the District Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in favor
the Board without comment on the basis that PhyMatrix failed
to establish that the Board opinion was totally erroneous. 118
E. Leases
In the case In re: Petitionfor Declaratory Statement of Barry
Zaretzky, M.D., the Board addressed a case in which a specialist
provided services in the office of various primary care physicians, paying those physicians "rent" for the use of their office
space. 1 9 However, it appears from the context of the Board's
opinion that the fee was paid only if Dr. Zaretzky used the
space. In addition, it appears that Dr. Zaretzky only used the
space if the hosting physician referred a patient to him. Consequently, the Board found that the arrangement constituted a
prohibited fee split.' 20
In a podiatric case, In re: the Petition for Declaratory Statement of Robert N. Wayne D.P.M., the Board of Podiatric
Medicine addressed an arrangement between a podiatrist and
Dr. Shaw, a physician. 2 ' The podiatrist owned a machine useable by both professionals within their practices. When a podia116. See id. at 5-6 of the original final order, attached as Exhibit A.
117. See id. at 13.
118. See PhyMatrix Mgmt. Co. v. Bakarania, 1999 WL 424411 (Fla. App. 1st Dist.
1999).
119. See In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Barry Zaretzky, M.D., 14
F.A.L.R. 3954 (1992).
120. Id, at 3956.
121. See In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Robert N. Wayne, D.P.M., 12
F.A.L.R. 4896 (1990).
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trist's patient required treatment using the machine that was
outside podiatry, the podiatrist referred the patient to Shaw,
quoting the patient a range of fees and rental of the machine to
Shaw for $200 per hour. The Board held that as long as the
podiatrist quoted a range of fees rather than Shaw's exact fee
and made the machine available to others at the same price, the
arrangement did not violate the fee-splitting statute. Interestingly, however, the Board did not address whether or not $200
per hour represented a fair amount for the rent of the machine
or even if the fair market value 1of
the machine's rental was an
22
issue in interpreting the statute.
F.

Equipment and Facility Ownership

In the case of In re: Petitionfor DeclaratoryStatement of Melbourne Health Associates, Inc. and John Lozito, the Board examined a transaction under which a limited partnership was
formed to own and operate a rehabilitation center in which physicians would be limited partners. 23 The Board found that the
arrangement did not violate the fee-splitting provisions because
the return on investment by the limited partners would be solely
through participation in the profits of the partnership, based
solely on the number of partnership units owned by that investor. The return on investment would not depend in any way24on
the number of referrals made by the investor to the entity.
The Board addressed the purchase of peripheral vascular
study equipment in In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of
Gene E. Myers, M.D.125 In this case, the physician was a shareholder in a corporation that owned the peripheral vascular study
equipment. The Board found that because the return on investment was based on the overall success of the corporation and
not referrals to or from the corporation by the investors, the
arrangement was not a violation of the fee-splitting provisions.
However, the Board held the fee-splitting provisions would be
violated if "the ability of an individual physician to participate in
this investment opportunity were tied in any way to his ability or
willingness to make referrals to the facility or the likelihood that
122. Id.
123. See In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Melborne Health Assoc.'s,
Inc. and John Lozito, 9 F.A.L.R. 6295 (1987).
124. See id. at 6297-98.
125. In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of Gene E. Myers, M.D., 10
F.A.L.R. 6272 (1988).
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he would do so."' 126 Investment arrangements are now restrained under the Stark laws and under the Florida Patient
127
Self-Referral Act.
IV.

MARKETING ACrIVITIES AND SPLIT-FEE ARRANGEMENTS

The Board of Medicine's rulings address the fee-splitting implications for marketing and marketing-related activities. With
the increasing competitiveness of the health care industry, marketing tools are necessary to generate business. The health law
question is whether the fee-splitting requirements can be
satisfied.
Marketing has been defined as the "analysis, planning, implementation and control of carefully formulated programs
designed to bring about voluntary exchanges of values with target markets for the purpose of achieving organizational objectives."' 2
Marketing in a general sense relies heavily on
designing an organization's offering, such as health care services,
in terms of the target markets, needs and desires; and using effective pricing, communication and distribution to inform, motivate, and service the markets.
A distinction can be drawn between two different types of
marketing: (1) direct or active marketing, and (2) indirect or
passive marketing. The OIG has employed this distinction in its
description of those activities that are subject to prosecution
under the federal anti-kickback statute. The OIG has taken the
position that the anti-kickback statute
on its face prohibits offering or acceptance of remuneration,
inter alia, for the purposes of 'arranging for or recommending
purchasing, leasing, or ordering any... service or item payable
under Medicare or Medicaid. Thus, we believe that many
marketing and advertising activities
may involve at least tech1 29
nical violations of the statute."
Media advertising, for example, may be a technical violation
of the anti-kickback laws, but does not warrant prosecution.
126. Id. at 6275; see also In re: Petition for Declaratory Statement of William D.
Ertag, 11 F.A.L.R 4351 (1989) (pertaining to durable medical equipment).
127. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.654 (West 1998) (Florida Patient Self-Referral
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (West 1998) (Stark II amendments). These statutes place
significant restrictions on the ability of a physician to benefit financially from patient
referrals to a third party in which that physician has an ownership interest or financial
relationship.
128.

PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, at 5 (1975).

129. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35952, 35974; see also OIG Advisory Opinion 98-1 (last updated Mar. 16, 1999) <http://www.hhs.gov/progorg/oig>.
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The OIG considers passive marketing activities as those activities that do not involve direct person-to-person solicitation of
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries or providers. 130 Despite
drawing this distinction, in Advisory Opinion 98-4, the OIG concluded that a PPMC management services contract that included
passive marketing duties and paid the PPMC on a percentage
basis implicated the anti-kickback statute because the percentfee could encourage overutilization and
age management
31
upcoding.1

The American Bar Association ("ABA") also distinguishes
between direct or active marketing, on one hand, and indirect or
passive marketing on the other, with respect to attorney advertising.' 32 The ABA defines direct marketing as selling directly
through a consumer without the use of a middleman. Examples
include mail orders, cold calling, telephone sales and door to
door sales. Indirect marketing occurs when the potential client
must initiate the contact with the law firm. Examples include
brochures, published articles, billboards, and newsletters. The
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility forbids direct advertising. Like the medical profession, the solicitation of business
by a lawyer through direct, in-person communication with a prospective client has long been viewed as inconsistent with the
profession's ideal of an attorney-client relationship and as 1pos33
ing a significant potential for harm to a prospective client.
The Rules regulating the Florida Bar that define permissible
advertising permit passive marketing. 34 For example, an attorney may advertise through the use of public media, such as a
telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, billboards and other signs, radio, television, and recorded
messages the public may access by dialing a telephone number,
or through written communication not involving direct
135
solicitation.
The Supreme Court has held that states have the power to
discipline lawyers for direct client solicitation. 136 The Court ra130. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35952; Bruce John Shih and Barton A. Carter, The Hidden
Pitfalls of Marketing by HealthcareProviders,10 No. 1 HEALTH LAW 8, 11 (1997); see
also OIG Advisory Opinion 98-1, supra note 129.
131. See OIG Advisory Opinion 98-4, supra note 8.
132. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr RULE 7.3 (1995).
133. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-104(A) (1980);
see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 7.3 (1995).
134. See FLA. ST. BAR RULE 4-7.2 (1996).
135. See id.
136. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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tionalized that active, in-person solicitation differs substantially
from passive advertising. Additionally, states have a stronger
interest in prohibiting "pressure-laden," in-person solicitation
than they do in prohibiting passive advertising of routine legal
services. The difference between public or indirect advertising
and in-person or direct advertising is the requirement that the
recipient make an immediate decision about representation
without time to compare the "availability, nature, and prices" of
other legal providers. Direct solicitation is a one-sided process
because it allows an attorney, trained in persuasion, the opportunity to manipulate an uninformed lay person. Therefore, because in-person attorney solicitation is usually done in private, it
is not subject to the public scrutiny that advertising receives.
The Court concluded that state solicitation regulations are preventative measures. These regulations "reduce the likelihood of
overreaching and the exertion of undue influence on lay persons,. . . protect the privacy of individuals, and ... avoid situations where the lawyer's exercise of judgment on behalf 1of37 the
client will be clouded by his own pecuniary self-interest.'
The Board of Medicine has not distinguished between active
and passive marketing with the clarity expressed by the Florida
Bar. Although the OIG has acknowledged the difference, OIG
Advisory Opinion 98-4 raises concerns that the difference is not
clearly recognized. 38 An argument can and should be made
that the distinction is applicable in fee-splitting cases. A percentage payment for marketing services should not universally
be viewed as a fee split regardless of the services provided.
The direct result of such a broad pronouncement is to preclude incentive-based payments to entities providing services as
basic to a successful medical practice as managed care contracting and passive marketing materials such as brochures and
print advertisements. This distinction goes well beyond a reasoned understanding of the intent of the fee-splitting and patient-brokering statutes designed to preclude physicians and
others from actively soliciting patients and referrals.
The restraints imposed by the approach of the Board of
Medicine and the OIG may also be unconstitutional infringements on free speech. A 1998 decision from the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Florida declared unconstitutional a Florida statute prohibiting dentists from advertising
137.
138.

Id. at 461.
See OIG Advisory Opinion 98-4, supra note 8.
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membership in or specialty recognition by an organization not
recognized or accredited by the American Dental Association. 139 The Court confirmed that commercial speech enjoys
First Amendment protection. Only commercial speech that is
false, deceptive or misleading can be prohibited. The Court
held that the Florida Board of Dentistry "may not rely on speculation or conjecture but must produce specific evidence to
demonstrate that the harms... are real and substantial."'14 The
Board failed to meet that standard.
The Federal Trade Commission position on professional advertising is similar. The FTC held that the California Dental Association's ethical advertising restraints violate the Sherman Act
because the rules restrained truthful, nondeceptive advertising.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided September 29, 1998, to conAssociasider, among other issues, whether or not the Dental
141
tion ethical restraint violates the Sherman Act.
Certainly neither the Board of Medicine nor OIG considered
the constitutional implications of its decisions in regard to marketing activities by a PPMC. If a dentist or a physician has the
constitutional right to engage in commercial advertising, then
the dentist or physician has the constitutional right to employ
professionals skilled in commercial free speech to assist them.
Engaging professionals, including PPMCs, should be constitutionally protected, as should fair market value compensation.
V.

THE MINNESOTA APPROACH

Upon careful examination of the Board of Medicine approach, one can easily argue that the Board has exceeded its
interpretive authority. One can also easily argue that the courts
have paid unusual deference to the Board's interpretations without careful analysis. Unfortunately, such arguments, without
legislative or further court support, leave well-meaning physicians exposed to discipline, fines and penalties. What appears to
be necessary is a statutory revision providing clear guidance.
For example, Minnesota law provides:
(p) Fee splitting, includes without limitation:
(1) paying, offering to pay, receiving, or agreeing to receive, a commission, rebate, or remuneration, directly or
139. See Borgner v. Cook, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
140. Id. at 1331.
141. See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720 (9th Cir., 1997), cert.
granted, 119 S.Ct. 29 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1998) (No. 97-1625).
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indirectly, primarily for the referral of patients or the prescription of drugs or devices;
(2) dividing fees with another physician or a professional
corporation, unless the division is in proportion to the service provided and the responsibility assumed by each professional and the physician has disclosed the terms of the
division;
(3) referring a patient to any health care provider in
which the referring physician has a significant financial interest unless the physician has disclosed the physician's
own profit interest; and
(4) dispensing for profit any drug or device, unless the
physician2 has disclosed the physician's own profit
14
interest.
The Minnesota Rules on the division of fees provide a simple
guide for the Board of Medicine:
In reviewing a division of fees.., the board may consider, but
is not limited to, the following factors regarding the reasonableness of the proportional division of fees:
A. the value of the professional services;
B. overhead costs;
C. time and distance traveled; and
D. the availability of the43service or the product elsewhere in
the local trade area.
CONCLUSION

Lost on the Board of Medicine has been the clean, crisp holding of the Florida Second District Court of Appeals that illegal
fee splitting involves direct, patient-specific activity rather than

business activity. In reaching its decision, the court said:
Such an interpretation recognizes the complexities of marketing and management of professional services in today's competitive business environment without compromising the
public policy behind legislation prohibiting or regulating the
division of professional fees.'"
Sadly, even if the percentage fee management contract used
by PhyMatrix had been validated on appeal, reversing the
Board of Medicine in Bakarania,unresolved issues remain because of Crow, Levy and other Board decisions.
142. MirN. STAT. ANN. § 147.091(p) (West 1998).
143. MINN. R. 5620.0160 (1998).
144. Practice Mgmt. Assoc.'s v. Orman, 614 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App.
1993); see also Practice Mgmt. Assoc's, Inc. v. Blickensderfer, 630 So. 2d 1147, 1148
(Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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The Minnesota statute cited above prohibits fee splitting
when compensation is paid "primarily for the referral of patients
or the prescription of drugs or devices." This approach is similar
to the AMA's ethical rules defining fee splitting:
Fee splitting arrangements between physicians and other independent practitioners in which payment is made merely for
referral of patients are unethical....1

The statute reaches a result similar to the Florida Second District Court of Appeals holding that limits fee splitting to payments made for the "mere referral" of patients. 4 6 The
reference to "primarily" or "merely" reflects the reality and requirements of medicine today.
Minnesota also permits physicians to divide fees for services
rendered, solving the global fee requirements of managed care.
This is helpful because the complexity of the managed care environment requires patient referrals, often among providers in exclusive networks who must share global fees. The market's
insistence on global fees demands that fees be split and shared
among those who do the work. The market has the ability to
dictate how those fees will be shared. PPMCs providing management, passive marketing and network organization may be
survival necessities. Statistics are abundantly available to those
charged with managing the system.
Guidance on the distinction between payment for a "mere referral" and for goods and services is provided in the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"). RESPA prohibits kickbacks in connection with a real estate settlement service related
to a federally funded loan. 147 An exception to the definition of
kickback is provided for fees for goods and services actually furnished. 148 Kickbacks are resolved under RESPA by determining
whether or not goods and services were furnished and whether
or not fair market value was charged for the services. 49 The
Board of Medicine, at least in dicta, has on occasions noted that
percentage fees exceed costs, but does not address the value of
the services. 5 ° Cost and value are not necessarily related, as
any person in business can attest. Percentage fees, a form of
145. 1998 AMA Policy Compendium H-140.991 (emphasis added).
146. See Orman, 614 So. 2d 1135; see also Blickensderfer, 630 So. 2d 1147.
147. See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (West 1998).
148. See id. § 2607(c).
149. See Taylor, III v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 181 F.R.D. 509 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
150. The cost discussion appears in many of the Board of Medicine determinations cited, including the pending BakaraniaDeclaratory Statement; see supra note 6.

Published by LAW eCommons, 1999

35

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 10

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 8

productivity compensation, are often the fair market value for
the services rendered. Percentage fees and productivity compensation are the norm in almost every business today.
Any legislation intended to fairly deal with kickbacks and referral fees should include an exception for goods and services
provided at fair market value, as does RESPA. Unstated in the
Minnesota law is whether kickbacks occur between employer
and employee.
In contrast, the federal anti-kickback statute provides an employee exemption and excepts from the kickback law "any
amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona
fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment in the provision of covered services."'' A similar provision should be part of any fee-split legislation.
With the variety of today's business organizations, selected for
tax and other reasons unrelated to health care regulation, the
employee exception should be expanded to encompass limited
liability company members and partners. Logic also indicates
that independent contractors paid fair market value compensation for other legitimate services should also be excluded, as rec-

ognized in OIG Advisory Opinion

98-10.152

Related is the issue of disclosure. Disclosure of interrelationships and compensation arrangements has been an integral element of securities offerings since the Securities Act of 1933
became law.' 5 3 Disclosure allows patients and buyers of health
care services to make informed decisions and set appropriate
contractual terms for relationships. Most states have adopted
requirements that physicians disclose investment interests in
health care facilities to patients. Minnesota requires disclosure
as part of its fee-split statute. Publicity stigmatizes inappropriate
behavior.15 4 The requirement for disclosure should be a part of
fee-split regulation.
The Florida Board of Medicine has approached fee splitting in
an arbitrary fashion, as if the idea exists in a vacuum. Its decisions lack practicality, and, as we have noted, may well exceed
the Board's statutory and constitutional authority. Fee splitting
demands definition and revision to fit today's environment.

151.
152.
153.

154.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (West 1998).
See OIG Advisory Opinion 98-10, supra note 102.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (West 1998).
See RODWIN, supra note 2, at 212.
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